FIU Law Review
Volume 5

Number 2

Article 16

Spring 2010

Mandatory Disclosure in the Market for Union Representation
Matthew T. Bodie
Saint Louis University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Other Law Commons

Online ISSN: 2643-7759
Recommended Citation
Matthew T. Bodie, Mandatory Disclosure in the Market for Union Representation, 5 FIU L. Rev. 617 (2010).
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.5.2.16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

Mandatory Disclosure in the Market
for Union Representation
Matthew T. Bodie
As we celebrate (and fret over) the seventy-fifth anniversary of the
1
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), I want to focus on one of the more
2
famous doctrines of the Act’s rich history. In General Shoe Corp., the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) established what is
known as the “laboratory conditions” doctrine. Using a memorable turn of
phrase, the Board stated: “In election proceedings, it is the Board’s function
to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires
3
of the employees.” The image of a laboratory being used to determine
“uninhibited desires” has always been wonderfully incongruous to me. But
the metaphor has lasted. Over one thousand Board and federal court deci-

Matthew T. Bodie is Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development at Saint Louis University School of Law. Professor Bodie would like to thank the Florida International University College of Law, Dean Alex Acosta, Professor Kerri Stone, and FIU Law Review for
the opportunity to participate in this terrific symposium. Professor Bodie is also grateful to Harold A.
Maier, Resident Officer of the Board’s Miami office, for his commentary on the paper.
1
Brooding over the current state of labor law has become a cherished part of NLRA anniversary
celebrations. See, e.g., Benjamin Aaron, The NLRB, Labor Courts, and Industrial Tribunals: A Selective
Comparison, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 35, 45 (1985) (“It must be admitted that after 50 years, the
Board still has not succeeded in providing adequate protection of the right to organize and to bargain
collectively, in developing effective remedies against unfair labor practices, or in substantially reducing
its ever-rising backlog of cases.”); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (1996) (“Sixty years after the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) was passed, collective action appears moribund.”); David L. Gregory & Raymond T.
Mak, Significant Decisions of the NLRB, 1984: The Reagan Board’s ‘Celebration’ of
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the NLRA, 18 CONN. L. REV. 7, 8-9 (1985) (“Although neither the Board, the
Act, nor labor law is irreversibly in extremis at this half-century crossroads, troublesome indicia
are present.”). The title of this conference calls to mind one of the more famous of these reflections:
Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J.
2767 (1991) (“The long and steady decline in the percentage of private-sector employees represented by
unions – a decline now in its fourth decade – preoccupies all thinking about American labor law today.”).
2
77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
3
Id. at 127.
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sions refer to the “laboratory conditions” doctrine, and it is still the touchstone for determining whether the results of a representation election are
enforced. Under this doctrine, the Board may order that an election be
vacated and conducted anew if the winning party violated the laboratory
conditions through its pre-election conduct.
The laboratory conditions doctrine suggests an active and vigorous
role for the Board in providing employees with the proper election environment. After all, it seems like a fairly arduous task to provide an experimental laboratory with “conditions as nearly ideal as possible.” And
indeed, the Board has an extensive list of prohibited conduct: threatening
speech, interrogations, polling, surveillance, promises of improved condi5
tions, grants of benefits, and inflammatory appeals. However, the Board
has been largely reactive in its regulation, keeping out certain sources of
election impurities but doing little to assist employees in their decision.
There is reason to doubt that employees are getting the information they
6
need when making their representation decision. At present, the Board
7
does little to ensure that such information is available. It would be well
within the Board’s current role as election regulator to make sure that
employees have easy access to the information they need.
In this symposium contribution, I examine how the Board could use a
mandatory disclosure regime to provide information to employees when
making their representation decision. In Part I, I discuss the information
already disclosed through the NLRA as well as the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act) and federal securities laws. In Part II, I discuss how the Board could pair this
information with a limited scheme of information disclosure to provide a
4
A Westlaw search on May 21, 2010 for laboratory conditions within the same sentence as
election (“laboratory conditions” /s election) returned 788 results in the FLB-NLRB database and 260
results in the ALLFEDS database.
5
See MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 317-62 (6th
ed. 2007) (providing an overview of campaign regulation).
6
Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 4,
45-69 (2008); see also Catherine L. Fisk, Thoughts on Treating Union Representation Processes as a
Market in Need of Legally Required Disclosure of Information, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (discussing
“the substantial information problems that already exist in the [election] process”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch,
Rent-to-Own Unionism?, 94 VA. L. REV. 9, 9 (2008) (discussing the “information deficiencies
implicated by union elections”); Harry G. Hutchison, The Market for Union Representation: An Information Deficit or Rational Behavior?, 94 VA. L. REV. 15, 16 (2008) (discussing how information “may
help workers make a free and reasoned choice”); Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of
Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (arguing that
workers must “have access to relevant firm-specific information” in order to be autonomous).
7
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., Working Paper at 2 (forthcoming 2011)
(noting that the value of employee communication to the representation process is “badly undervalued”).
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base level of election-related information to employees. I conclude with
thoughts on the way forward.
I. DISCLOSURE UNDER CURRENT LAW
A.

Disclosure under the NLRA

At present, the Board places no disclosure requirements on unions or
employers in the context of a union representation campaign. In fact, it has
held that even extreme circumstances do not require parties to disclose. In
Florida Mining & Materials Corp., the only case to examine this issue at
length, the petitioning union – a Teamsters local – had been placed into
receivership by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) the day
8
before the representation election. Evidence gathered after the fact,
through internal union documents as well as press coverage, indicated that
the takeover was triggered by “an irreconcilable conflict between the top
9
union officers which rendered the local unable to function.” Further, the
IBT’s letter announcing the takeover stated that: “Unless immediate action
is taken, it cannot be assured that the Local Union will be able to fulfill its
duties as bargaining representative or to carry out the other legitimate
10
objects of a labor organization.” As a result of the takeover, all officers
and business agents of the local were replaced. In a newspaper interview
after the takeover, the IBT-appointed trustee reported that “financial mismanagement” had left the local $18,000 in debt, and he “expressed doubt
11
about the continued existence of the local.” However, the article also
described picketing at the union headquarters by union members who were
“greatly disturbed by both the imposition of the trusteeship and the firing of
12
officers and agents.”
The employer objected to the election under the laboratory conditions
doctrine based on the union’s failure to disclose this information. The
employer alleged that this receivership signified the local’s precarious
financial status, and that as a result the local would be unqualified to
13
properly represent the bargaining unit. The Board affirmed the regional
14
director’s decision overruling the employer’s objections, and the Fifth
8

Fla. Mining & Materials Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1972), enforced, 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir.

1973).
9

Fla. Mining & Materials Corp. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id.
11 Id. at 66-67.
12 Id. at 67.
13 Fla. Mining, 198 N.L.R.B. at 601-02.
14 The Regional Director’s opinion and Board order affirming that opinion were not published.
The Board did publish its summary enforcement of the § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain. Id. at 603-04.
10
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Circuit enforced the order to bargain. Noting that an affirmative disclosure rule “has never been formulated or imposed in any reported case,” the
16
Board argued to the court that such a rule would not make sense.
Although it found the case to present an extremely close question, the Fifth
Circuit found that the Board had not abused its discretion, noting that the
unusual proximity between the takeover and the election likely rendered
17
this situation “a unique problem.”
The Board’s arguments against disclosure in Florida Mining follow a
familiar set of concerns with any disclosure regime. First, the Board contended that setting up such a regime would entail “great difficulty in deter18
mining the scope and extent of an affirmative disclosure rule.” Once the
regime was established, moreover, “losing parties would be quick to take
advantage of any such rule in an effort to avoid the consequences of a free
19
election.” Second, the Board fell back on its “neutral umpire” role:
Under the campaign processes as they now exist, the competing arguments pro and con on unionization are left to be presented by the
parties. The employer, because of supposed financial and entrepreneurial disadvantages flowing from unionization, is assigned the role
of bringing the alleged negative aspects of unionization to the attention of the electorate. Likewise, the union is to stress its advantages.
The Board, as referee, steps in only in the case of low blows, and
even then only when the injured party does not have sufficient time to
20
present a response.
Essentially, the Board disclaims any duty to provide employees with
the information they need to make a decision; this role is left to the parties.

15
16
17

Fla. Mining, 481 F.2d at 65.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 69. In explaining its decision, the court stated:

It appears to the court that employees should have the right to know prior to voting for a union that
at least for a short time actual control of the day to day administration of the local was to be
handled by a representative of the International, not by those people whom the employees had understood to be the heads of the local. On the other hand, we fully recognize the administrative difficulties which would follow from a rule designed to cover this case. Furthermore, we agree that
recalcitrant employers would take advantage of the situation and file meaningless challenges in an
effort to further delay implementation of the desires of the employees. Since ours is not a duty to
resolve these intricate competing interests but only to review the initial decision of the administrative body, we do not feel we have to analyze and balance these competing factors in detail.
Id. at 70.
18 Id. at 67.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 67-68.
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Third, even if the Board were to supply the information relevant to the
21
election, it would be unsure of what this information would be. According
to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he Board actually admits that in all likelihood the
22
voter’s choice is ‘too often inescapably non-rational.’” The court was left
to suss out the ramifications of this view: “the Board seems to be saying
that specific information is rarely, if ever, important to an employee faced
23
with a unionization vote.” Fourth and finally, the Board argued that the
information in this particular case – the trusteeship – was not all that relevant to the representation decision. The Board framed the issue as one of
internal union governance, and argued that “studies of employee nonparticipation amply illustrate that democratic participation in union affairs
24
is not an important concern of voters.”
In my view, none of these arguments is persuasive. Yes, administrative costs could be daunting, but it all depends on how the disclosure
requirement is framed. The Board could require disclosure and still remain
a “neutral umpire,” in the same way agencies such as the EPA, the FDA,
and the SEC face similar requirements. But more importantly, according to
its own standard the Board is not really supposed to be an umpire – it is
25
supposed to be establishing laboratory conditions. It needs to see itself as
an advocate for the employees, not a referee in a contest between union and
26
employer. The “irrational” trope seems nihilistic and condescending; can
it really be that we don’t know anything about what information employees
want? In fact, the Board seems to contradict this in its final argument,
which claims that employees don’t really care if the union is going into
trusteeship. I do not share the Board’s sanguinity on this. The Teamsters’
decision to take over the local demonstrates something about the ability of
the local to do its job well.

21 Id. at 68 (“[The Board] argues that no one knows what diverse information the electorate might
find useful in assessing the pros and cons of unionism.”).
22 For this proposition, the Board apparently relied on Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 38, 65 (1964). See Fla. Mining, 481 F.2d at 68.
23 Id.
24 Id. The court appears to have disagreed somewhat on the ramifications of trusteeship. Id.
(“We do note, however, that the Board admits the revelation of the trusteeship would have brought to
light all of the problems present in the administration of this local.”).
25 As I have argued previously, this failure to insure that the employee receives the proper level of
information “does not comport with the laboratory conditions model, where information would play a
critical role in establishing the conditions for a fair and reasoned choice.” Bodie, Information, supra
note 6, at 24.
26 For more on the problems with the “political election” model, see Craig Becker, Democracy in
the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993);
Bodie, Information, supra note 6, at 31-34, 45-69.
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Florida Mining remains a footnote to history, if that. The Board has
never really seriously considered implementing a regime of information
disclosure. The only required disclosure in the election context is procedural in nature. Under the Excelsior doctrine, employers must disclose the
names and addresses of employees in the unit to the union after an election
27
petition has been filed. This Excelsior requirement gives the union the
ability to provide information to employees, and it was justified on that
28
basis. However, the Board has yet to expand this requirement to include
29
phone numbers or email addresses. And the Board provides no formal
30
method to channel information from unions and employers to employees.
The only other example of information disclosure relating to elections
under Board law is the recent requirement imposed by Dana Corp., that
employees be informed of their right to file a decertification petition within
31
forty-five days of the employer’s voluntary recognition of the union. If
employees never receive notice of their right to file such a petition, then the
Board will not apply the “voluntary recognition” election bar to prevent
32
employees from filing a decertification petition. Like Excelsior, this notification requirement pertains more to procedure than substance. It simply
requires that employees be informed of one of the rights they can exercise
under the Act before those rights can be limited through the recognition
33
bar. If they are not so informed, then those rights will not be limited.
In short, the Board has no history of mandatory information disclosure
and has evinced little desire to create one. However, I would argue that this
reluctance is based on outdated, overblown, and even offensive policy
judgments that should be reconsidered in this new century. And if the
Board were interested in ensuring that employees get a baseline of infor27 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966) (requiring that the information
must be given to the union within seven days of the approval of an election agreement).
28 Id. at 1240 (“[A]n employee who has had an effective opportunity to hear the arguments concerning representation is in a better position to make a more fully informed and reasonable choice.
Accordingly, we think that it is appropriate for us to remove the impediment to communication to which
our new rule is directed.”).
29 See G. Micah Wissinger, Informing Workers of the Right to Workplace Representation: Reasonably Moving from the Middle of the Highway to the Information Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 331, 342-43 (2003) (proposing that unions be given private employee email addresses as part of
the Excelsior disclosure).
30 For discussions of the limitations of employee communication and discourse, see Bodie,
Information, supra note 6, at 23-24; Hirsch, supra note 7.
31 In re Dana Corp., 353 N.L.R.B. 434, 434 (2007).
32 Id. (“[N]o election bar will be imposed after a card-based recognition unless (1) employees in
the bargaining unit receive notice of the recognition and of their right, within 45 days of the notice, to
file a decertification petition or to support the filing of a petition by a rival union, and (2) 45 days pass
from the date of notice without the filing of a valid petition.”).
33 Id.
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mation necessary to making their decision, it could bootstrap onto other
disclosure regimes that provide a lot of relevant data. The Board would not
have to start from scratch.
B.

Disclosure under the LMRDA

Although a regime of information disclosure would be new for the
union representation campaign, it would not be new for the unions themselves. The Board regulates the relationship between union and employers
and creates the regulatory regime for the initial choice by employees of
whether to join a union. The Department of Labor, on the other hand, oversees the management and organization of the union itself, including internal
union elections and a union’s relationship with its members. While the
NLRB may not require disclosure in the representation election context, the
Department of Labor requires unions to provide extensive disclosure to
34
their members. This disclosure is required under the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act), and
covers much of the union’s internal governance and finances. A system of
mandatory disclosure in the representation context could piggyback off the
existing LMRDA system as long as there is overlap between the two sets of
disclosures.
Since 1960 the Department of Labor has provided forms through
which unions meet the disclosure requirements under Landrum-Griffin.
Form LM-1 provides for disclosure of dues, fees, and organizational struc35
ture under section 201(a) of the Act. Forms LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 are
the annual reports that cover a union’s organizational and financial disclo36
sure under LMRDA section 201(a) and (b). Form LM-2 is the form for
largest unions; the amounts changed over time, but 2003 amendments
37
placed the threshold at unions with receipts of $250,000 or more. The
34 In many ways, the split between the two systems resembles the split in regulation of the sale of
securities. The federal system of required disclosure for the sale of corporate securities proceeds largely
in two steps. First, before a firm decides to offer a security for sale, it must proffer extensive information about itself, its finances, its prospects, the expected price, and other information deemed relevant
to potential buyers. Second, once the security has been sold to initial buyers and thereafter is traded on
the public markets, firms have a continuing obligation to disclose relevant financial information, insider
transactions, executive compensation, and other matters relevant to the security’s value. Each step is
established largely by one of the New Deal securities acts: the Securities Act of 1933 is primarily about
initial disclosure, while the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 primarily concerns the trading of securities
on public markets. THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION [ch. 1] (4th
ed. 2002). In this respect, as in the market for union representation, there are two disclosure paradigms:
one for the initial “purchase” and one for “members” after purchase.
35 29 C.F.R. §§ 402.2-402.3 (2006).
36 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2006).
37 29 C.F.R. § 403.2(d).
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Department of Labor estimates that while only twenty percent of unions
meet this threshold, these unions received about ninety-three percent of the
38
total dollars received annually by unions. Forms LM-3 and LM-4 are
39
simplified for smaller unions. Along with these annual forms are specific
forms for certain types of disclosures. Form LM-30 pertains to potential
conflicts of interest on the part of union employees or their families. Form
LM-10 requires employers to disclose payments made to unions. Unions
40
under trusteeship must also file a specific set of forms.
As it happens, I am writing this contribution in the midst of administrative change. During the Bush Administration, the Department of Labor
gave many of these forms their first significant overhaul in more than forty
41
42
years. These changes were challenged in court and partially struck down.
Amendments to the regulation made by the Bush Administration Department of Labor were published in the Federal Register the day after Presi43
dent Obama’s inauguration. The Obama Department of Labor is now in
44
the process of undoing some of these changes. What follows is a more
detailed discussion of the disclosure requirements provided for by the
Department of Labor’s current regulations. The reader is cautioned, however, that further changes may soon be forthcoming.
1. Dues and Fees
The LMRDA evinces a key interest in the regulation of union dues and
fees. Section 101(a)(3) of the Act provides that local dues can only be
45
increased through a secret ballot majority vote of the membership.
Section 201(a) requires unions to provide information on “the initiation fee
or fees required” as well as “the regular dues or fees or other periodic pay46
ments required to remain a member.” Form LM-1 requires that the union

38 Recent Regulation: Department of Labor Increases Union Financial Reporting Requirements,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1734, 1736 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Regulation].
39 Form LM-3 is a four-page report for unions with receipts less than $200,000, 29 C.F.R. §
403.4(a)(1) (2006), and Form LM-4 is a two-page report for unions with receipts of less than $10,000,
id. § 403.4(a)(2).
40 See Forms LM-15, 29 C.F.R. §§ 408.3, 408.4 (2006); LM-15A, 29 C.F.R. §§ 408.4, 408.8
(2006); LM-16, 29 C.F.R. § 408.8 (2006).
41 See 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374 (Oct. 9, 2003).
42 AFL-CIO v. Chao, 409 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
43 74 Fed. Reg. 3678 (Jan. 21, 2009).
44 See 74 Fed. Reg. 52,401, 52,402 (Oct. 13, 2009) (discussing the proposed changes).
45 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (2006). Dues for federation of national or international labor organizations can only be raised through a majority vote of the delegates voting at a convention, a majority vote
in a membership referendum conducted by secret ballot, or as an interim matter, by majority vote of the
members of the executive board. Id.
46 Id. § 431(a)(3)-(4).
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47

set forth its dues and fees structure as an initial matter. Forms LM-2, LM3, and LM-4 provide for the annual disclosure of the dues and fees required
48
by the union for members. The categories are regular dues and fees,
49
initiation fees, transfer fees, and work permits.
2. Organizational Structure
Section 201(a) of the LMRDA requires unions to provide the Depart50
ment of Labor with a copy of its constitution and bylaws. In addition, the
union is required to file a report providing: the names and titles of union
officers; the union’s dues and fees structure; and detailed statements about
the union’s procedures for such matters as qualifications for or restrictions
on membership, authorization for disbursement of funds, audit of financial
transactions of the labor organization, the calling of regular and special
meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, disciplinary fines and suspensions, authorization for bargaining demands, ratification of contract
51
terms, and authorization for strikes.
Form LM-1 provides for the disclosure of this information and must be
52
filed within 90 days of when a union becomes subject to the LMRDA.
Along with its constitution and bylaws, the union must prepare a report
citing to the page, section, or paragraph number of the governing documents that cover the procedures discussed in the statute itself, such as qualifications for or restrictions on membership and authorization for disburse53
ment of funds. The initial report also requires the union to list its officers,
54
as well as the date of the next election. In its annual financial report, the
55
union is required to list all of its officers, the date of its next election of
56
57
officers, and the number of members it has.

47 Form LM-1 Labor Organization Information Report 2, http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/
compliance/GPEA_Forms/lm-1p.pdf.
48 Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/
lm2_blankForm.pdf; Form LM-3 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/
compliance/lm3_blankForm.pdf; Form LM-4
Labor
Organization
Annual
Report 2,
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/lm4_blankForm.pdf.
49 Form LM-2, supra note 48, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 48, at 2. Form LM-2 also includes a
category for “working” dues and fees, as opposed to regular dues and fees. Form LM-2, supra note 48,
at 2. Form LM-4 only requires the union to report any changes in its dues or fees structure. Form LM4, supra note 48, at 2.
50 29 U.S.C. § 431(a).
51 Id.
52 Form LM-1, supra note 47.
53 29 C.F.R. § 402.1 (2009); Form LM-1, supra note 47, at 3.
54 Form LM-1, supra note 47, at 2.
55 Form LM-2, supra note 48, at Schedule 11; Form LM-3, supra note 48, at 3.
56 Form LM-2, supra note 48, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 48, at 2.
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3. Financial Disclosure
LMRDA § 201(b) requires that unions file annual reports, signed by
the president and treasurer, disclosing details about the union’s financial
58
Specifically, the Act requires disclosure of
condition and operations.
assets and liabilities, receipts during the year and sources for the receipts,
salaries, and other disbursements for all officers and employees making
more than $10,000, loans of more than $250 to officers and employees, all
loans to business enterprises, and “other disbursements made by [the
59
union].” The Secretary of the Department of Labor is given authority to
60
prescribe the rules and regulations for filing the annual reports.
Prior to the 2003 changes, the Department of Labor asked unions to
disclose their overall assets and liabilities, as well as their general receipts
61
and disbursements. Under the 2003 changes, unions who file the LM-2
are not only required to list their general receipts and disbursements, but to
62
Separate
itemize them as well (for amounts greater than $5,000).
63
schedules provide for the itemization of accounts receivable, loans
64
65
66
receivable, investments and fixed assets, and other assets and liabilities.
Unions also must itemize individual receipts and disbursements made to
support particular union functions, such as contract negotiation and admin67
istration, organizing, and political activities. In addition to these itemizations, unions must break down the time each officer or employee spends on
68
the various activities of the organization.

57

Form LM-2, supra note 48, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 48, at 2; Form LM-4, supra note 48,

at 2.
58

29 U.S.C. § 431(b) (2006).
Id.
60 Id. § 438.
61 See Recent Regulation, supra note 38, at 1735.
62 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374, 58,429-30 (Oct. 9, 2003).
63 See 2003 Form LM-2 (copy on file with author).
64 Id. at Schedule 2.
65 Id. at Schedule 3 (sales of investments and fixed assets); id. at Schedule 4 (purchases of
investments and fixed assets); id. at Schedule 5 (investments); Schedule 6 (fixed assets).
66 Id. at Schedule 7 (other assets); id. at Schedule 10 (other liabilities).
67 See id. Schedule 14 covers “other receipts,” schedule 15 covers “contract negotiation and
administration,” schedule 16 covers “organizing,” schedule 17 covers “political activities,” schedule 18
covers “lobbying,” schedule 19 covers “contributions, gifts, and grants,” schedule 20 covers “benefits,”
schedule 21 covers “general overhead,” and schedule 22 covers “other disbursements.” See also Form
LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report 18, http://www.dol.gov/olms/
regs/compliance/lm2_blankForm.pdf. .
68 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,471; Form LM-2, supra note 48, at Schedule 11.
59
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The 2003 changes to the financial disclosure forms largely remain in
69
place. However, on the day after President Obama’s inauguration, the
Department of Labor published a new set of rules requiring even further
70
financial disclosure. The new rules required unions to disclose additional
information in the context of asset and investment transactions, disbursements to officers and employees, and itemization of certain categories of
71
receipts. However, this rule had been rescinded by the Department in
72
October 2003. The Department argued that a more thorough investigation
on the effects of the 2003 changes to the LM-2 was needed before
73
additional changes to the forms were made.
4. Conflicts of Interest.
Much of the work of the McClellan Committee – a precursor to
Landrum-Griffin – focused on widespread graft and self-dealing by union
74
officials. Section 202 of the LMRDA requires union officers and employ75
ees to disclose a wide array of potential conflicts of interest. These disclosures include any financial interests held by an employee in a business
represented by the union, any transactions between such a business and a
union employee, and any payments made by a represented business to the
union or its employees. The statute is very specific: A union employee
must disclose, for example, “any transaction in which he or his spouse or
minor child engaged, directly or indirectly, involving any stock, bond, security, or loan to or from, or other legal or equitable interest in the business of
an employer whose employees such labor organization represents or is
76
actively seeking to represent.”
Similarly, all transactions must be
disclosed “except work performed and payments and benefits received as a

69 In AFL-CIO v. Chao, 409 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the court upheld the changes to the LM-2,
but struck down Form T-1, a supplemental form regarding general trust reporting. The court found that
Form T-1 exceeded the Department’s authority. Id. at 378. The Department recently proposed rescinding the T-1 and moving some of the required disclosure into the LM-2. 75 Fed. Reg. 5456 (Feb. 2,
2010).
70 74 Fed. Reg. 3678 (Jan. 21, 2009).
71 Id.; see also 74 Fed. Reg. 52,401, 52,402 (Oct. 13, 2009) (discussing the proposed changes).
72 74 Fed. Reg. at 52,402.
73 Id. at 52,402, 52,409. The Department also rescinded the rules regarding the Department’s
ability to revoke a union’s authorization to file an LM-3 form. Id. at 52409-52412. The former Labor
Secretary has criticized these moves. Elaine L. Chao, Obama Tries to Stop Union Disclosure, WALL ST.
J., May 6, 2009.
74 Benjamin Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 851, 883 (1960) (discussing “the sordid record, gathered by the McClellan Committee, of the
misuse of union funds by some officers and employees”).
75 29 U.S.C. § 432 (2006).
76 Id. § 432(a)(2).
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bona fide employee of such employer and except purchases and sales of
goods or services in the regular course of business at prices generally avail77
able to any employee of such employer.”
Employers have their own set of disclosures related to conflicts of
interest. The LMRDA requires that employers disclose any payments made
to union officials or employees – a reciprocal obligation to that of the
78
union’s. Employers must also disclose any payments made to employees
or to outside labor consultants in an effort to persuade employees to exer79
cise or not to exercise their collective rights. Such payments include those
designed to interfere in collective rights or to obtain information on
80
employee or union efforts related to a dispute with the employer. Courts
have determined that section 203 reflects “the congressional conviction that
quite without regard to the motives or methods of particular individuals
engaging in it, the persuader business was detrimental to good labor rela81
tions and the continued public interest.”
Regulations regarding the disclosure of such conflict of interest payments are in flux. Form LM-30, which covers conflict of interest disclosures for unions, was amended by the Department of Labor in 2007. The
revisions increased the disclosures from two pages to nine pages and required greater detail on the nature and purpose of the transaction. However,
in 2009 the Department announced rulemaking proceedings to review the
changes to the form. The Department’s website currently states that “fundamental questions regarding the scope and extent of the [2007 amended]
reporting obligations are unanswered, and litigation challenging some
82
aspects of the form remains pending.” Therefore, the Department will
77

Id. § 432(a)(5).
Id. § 433(a)(1).
79 Id. § 433(a)(2)-(5).
80 Id. § 433(a)(4).
81 Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 1969).
82 Office of Labor-Management Standards, Form LM-30 Labor Organization Officer and Employee Report, at: http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/GPEA_Forms/blanklmforms.htm#
FLM30. The website states:
Note: The Office of Labor-Management Standards published in the Fall 2009 Semi-Annual Regulatory Agenda notice of an intended rulemaking to revise the Form LM-30 (Labor Organization
Officer and Employee Report). See http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?
pubId=200910&RIN=1215-AB74. The rulemaking is intended to review questions of policy and
law surrounding these reporting requirements. The rulemaking will focus on the changes resulting
from a 2007 regulatory revision of the Form and instructions. This revision dramatically altered the old Form LM-30 and instructions, which had not substantially changed in over 40
years. Despite the promulgation of the new Form LM-30, fundamental questions regarding the
scope and extent of the reporting obligations are unanswered, and litigation challenging some
aspects of the form remains pending. In light of this uncertainty, the pending regulatory action, the
pending litigation and the continuing obligation of union officers and employees pursuant to section 202 of the Labor-Management and Reporting Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 432,
78
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accept either the pre- or the post-2007 form and will not bring enforcement
83
actions based on a failure to use the new form.
5. Example: Local Union 1199, Service Employees Int’l Union
Looking at an actual set of disclosures may assist in illuminating the
nature and extent of those disclosures. The 2004 LM-2 provided by Local
84
1199 of the Service Employees International Union is one such example;
it is available online through a search of the Department of Labor’s web85
site. The 196-page document provides the annual disclosure for Local
86
1199, one of the largest and most successful unions in the country.
According to the 2004 form, Local 1199 has 240,000 members, roughly
87
$60 million in assets, and roughly $15 million in liabilities. Dues range
88
from $13 to $75, with initiation fees ranging from $75 to $200. The union
received over $100 million in dues, and total receipts were over $137 million. The LM-2 also provides a breakdown of investments, fixed assets,
other assets, sales and purchases of investments and assets, and loans
89
payable.
The LM-2 also provides a list of all officers as well as their total compensation. The form lists 131 officers who receive a total of over $5
90
million in total compensation. Union president Dennis Rivera received
91
$147,710 in total compensation for 2004. The form also itemizes all
disbursements to employees; each employee is listed by name, title, and
92
total compensation. Finally, there are schedules for benefits, contribu-

OLMS has determined that it would not be a good use of resources to bring enforcement actions
based upon a failure to use a specific form to comply with the statutory obligation to report certain
financial information. Accordingly, OLMS will refrain from initiating enforcement actions against
union officers and union employees based solely on the failure to file the report required by section 202, using the 2007 form, as long as individuals meet their statutorily-required filing obligation in some manner. OLMS will accept either the old Form LM-30 or the new one for purposes
of this non-enforcement policy.
83 Id.
84 Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report, Local 1199, Service Employees International
Union, March 28, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter Local 1199 Form LM-2].
85 The Department of Labor, Office of Labor-Management Standards, maintains a website
through which it is possible to obtain electronic versions of union annual reports. Department of Labor,
Public Disclosure under the LMRDA, available at http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/rrlo/
pubdiscl.htm.
86 For more information about Local 1199, visit its website at: http://www.1199seiu.org/.
87 Local 1199 Form LM-2, supra note 84, at 2, 3.
88 Id. at 2.
89 Id. at Schedules 1-8.
90 Id. at Schedule 9.
91 Id.
92 Id. at Schedule 10.
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tions, gifts, grants, office and administrative expenses, and other receipts
93
and disbursements.
C.

Employer Disclosure under the Federal Securities Laws

Perhaps the most comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme of
contractual regulation is the federal system of securities regulation. Even
before the New Deal, state blue sky laws placed special restrictions on the
94
95
sale of securities beyond the common law. The Securities Act of 1933
96
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 then completely reshaped the
playing field. They put into place a comprehensive federal system
premised on antifraud protection and a process of mandatory disclosure.
This scheme, while fleshed out through seventy years of amendment, regulation, and judicial opinion, retains relatively the same structure with
which it began.
The disclosure requirements mandated by federal regulation are considerably broad. In the context of an initial offering, section 5 of the 1993
Act requires that issuers file a comprehensive registration statement with
97
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 7 of the 1933 Act,
along with Schedule A, sets forth the basics of the disclosure requirements
and also empowers the Commission to establish further disclosure regula98
tions. Schedule A sets forth thirty-two separate provisions of disclosure,
including the issuer’s articles of incorporation or other structural docu99
100
ments, the general character of the issuer’s business, the amount of out101
102
standing debt, remuneration paid to directors and officers, the security’s
103
price (or method of calculating the price), items relating to possible con104
105
flicts of interest, a detailed balance sheet, and a profit and loss state106
ment. The Commission has further refined these requirements through a

93

Id. at Schedules 11-15.
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV.
347, 348 (1991).
95 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
96 Id. §§ 78a-78mm.
97 Id. § 77e.
98 Id. §§ 77g, 77aa.
99 Id. § 77aa(31).
100 Id. § 77aa(8).
101 Id. § 77aa(12).
102 Id. § 77aa(14).
103 Id. § 77aa(16).
104 See id. §§ 77aa(17) (commissions paid to underwriters); 77aa(20) (amounts paid to promoters);
77aa(22) (recent issuer purchases of property held by directors or substantial stockholders).
105 Id. § 77aa(25).
106 Id. § 77aa(26).
94
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series of forms and further regulations. The Commission’s forms break
down what information must merely be disclosed to the Commission and
what information must also be provided in the prospectus, a document
107
provided to potential purchasers. However, these forms generally refer to
Regulation S-K to define what exactly must be provided. Regulation S-K is
significantly more detailed than Schedule A, detailing precisely what types
108
of quantitative and qualitative information must be disclosed.
For
example, Regulation S-K has extremely detailed requirements on the
109
disclosure of financial information, including a special provision on management’s discussion and analysis of the firm’s financial condition and
110
results of its operations.
In the context of a securities offering, federal law integrates the
required disclosure within an overall process of restrictions on information
dissemination. Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act prohibits all offers to sell the
111
However, the
securities prior to the filing of the registration statement.
Commission has given an extremely broad definition to the term “offer,”
holding that any communication reasonably calculated to generate a buying
112
interest is an offer.
After the registration materials have been filed, the
issue enters the “waiting period” until the Commission has made the registration statement effective. Offers to sell made during the waiting period
must generally also provide all of the information required in the prospec113
tus.
Since some of this information may not be available until the
offering price has been set, it may be impossible to furnish the required
114
prospectus during the waiting period.
The Commission thus has made a
115
limited exception to this Catch-22 by allowing “tombstone ads” and
116
preliminary “red herring” prospectuses.
Once the waiting period has
107 See, e.g., Form S-1, Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-1.pdf.
108 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.702 (2010).
109 See id. §§ 229.301-229.304.
110 See id. § 229.303.
111 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
112 Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959); see also JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L.
HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 723 (2d ed. 2003). There are some exceptions to this prohibition. See SEC
Rules 137-139, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.137-139 (2005).
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (defining any written offer as a prospectus); id. at § 77e(b)(1)
(requiring all prospectuses to contain certain information once the registration statement has been filed).
114 COX & HAZEN, supra note 112, at 724.
115 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10); 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2005).
116 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (2005). This document is called a “red herring” prospectus because of the
legend required by Item 501(b)(10) of Regulation S-K, which traditionally was in red ink. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.501(b)(10) (2010) (requiring the following legend: “The information in this prospectus is not
complete and may be changed. We may not sell these securities until the registration statement filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission is effective. This prospectus is not an offer to sell these secu-
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ended, all written offers for sale must be accompanied by a complete pro117
spectus.
Although quite complicated, the registration process is designed to
accomplish three primary purposes: (1) make material information about
the issuer public, (2) require the issuer to deliver some of that information
to potential investors (through the prospectus), and (3) restrict the issuer’s
opportunities to promote its securities outside of these channels. It does not
seem a stretch to say that the 1933 Act, and by extension the Commission,
are endeavoring to create “laboratory conditions” for the sales of securities.
They are trying to get material information to the consumer, and at the same
time they are limiting opportunities for purchase without such information.
In contrast to the 1933 Act’s focus on a security’s initial sale, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the sales of securities after they have
been issued and are traded on the open market. The 1934 Act establishes a
118
registration and supervision system for national securities exchanges and
requires continuing disclosure for companies whose securities trade on
119
those markets. The mandatory disclosure comes in the form of periodic
reports: Form 10-K, an annual report; Form 10-Q, a quarterly report; and
120
Form 8-K, an interim report required in limited circumstances. The 1934
121
Act also regulates brokers, members, and dealers of the exchanges, and
imposes certain requirements with respect to proxy solicitations and tender
122
The SEC also enacted Rule 10b-5, its comprehensive antifraud
offers.
provision, under section10 of the 1934 Act.
The SEC has been out front in delivering its required disclosure to
securities consumers and the public. In 1984 it first developed the Elec123
tronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval, system known as EDGAR.
EDGAR is an easily-searchable database of all disclosure filings made by
124
A quick search can
companies covered by the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
retrieve all of a company’s registration statements, prospectuses, and peri-

rities and it is not soliciting an offer to buy these securities in any state where the offer or sale is not
permitted.”).
117 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b).
118 Id. § 78f.
119 Id. § 78m.
120 See Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio? U.S. Investors are Unknowingly Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151, 1209 n.353 (2010).
121 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k, 78o(c).
122 Id. §§ 78m, 78n.
123 Charles N. Charnas & D. Craig Nordlund, Introduction to Operational EDGAR: An Outline for
Electronic Filing with the SEC, 969 PLI/CORP. 281, 285 (1997).
124 See SEC Filing & Forms (EDGAR), available at http://www.sec.gov/
edgar.shtml.
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125

odic reports filed on Forms 8-K, 10-K, and 10-Q. Since the mid 1990s,
126
EDGAR had been an integral part of the disclosure process.
The SEC
requires that filers provide their disclosure using the EDGAR Filer Manual,
127
Access to the disclosure is viewed as a
now in its fourteenth version.
critical part of the SEC’s mission, and the agency frequently tweaks its sys128
tems to provide better service.
Passed in the midst of the bust following the boom of the 1920s, the
New Deal securities acts aimed at eliminating fraud through greater disclosure and penalties for noncompliance. Required disclosure was seen as a
way of bringing more “sunlight,” in Brandeis’ famous phrase, into the inner
129
workings of corporate shares. Preventing fraud was only one end of the
spectrum, however. On the other end, proponents and enforcers of the New
Deal acts hoped that the outflow of information would lead to better pricing
and trading on the markets. The Acts, particularly the 1933 Act, were seen
as a way of making sure the securities markets acted rationally. In a 1933
article supporting the legislation, William O. Douglas and George E. Bates
wrote that the effects of the 1933 Act would be: “(1) prevention of excesses
and fraudulent transactions, which will be hampered and deterred merely by
the requirement that their deals be revealed; and (2) placing in the market
during the early stages of the life of a security a body of facts which, operating indirectly through investment services and expert investors, will tend
130
to produce more accurate appraisal of the worth of the security. . . .”
Echoing the thoughts of Douglas and Bates, the SEC later explained the
purpose of the 1933 Act as twofold:
The Securities Act, often referred to as the ‘truth in securities’ Act,
was designed not only to provide investors with adequate information
upon which to base their decisions to buy and sell securities, but also
to protect legitimate business seeking to obtain capital through honest
131
protestation against competition from crooked promoters. . . .

125 SEC, Researching Public Companies through EDGAR: A Guide for Investors, available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/edgarguide.htm.
126 Charnas & Nordlund, supra note 123, at 286.
127 17 C.F.R. § 232.301 (2010).
128 See, e.g., SEC, EDGAR Search Updates, available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/
edgarsearchupdates.htm.
129 See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
(“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
130 William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171,
172 (1933).
131 10 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 14 (1944); see also Securities and Exchange Commission, The Work of
the Securities and Exchange Commission 1 (1967) (stating that the New Deal Acts require disclosure so
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II. A NEW MODEL FOR REPRESENTATION ELECTION REGULATION
This paper seeks to start the conversation about the specifics of a new
model for regulating the union representation election. The current system
is a strange admixture of ambiguous and heavy-handed requirements about
what may be said combined with a completely hands-off approach to what
must be said. As a result, unions and employers must step carefully during
the campaign so as to avoid statements or conduct that violate the Board’s
“laboratory conditions” doctrine. At the same time, the Board makes no
effort to ensure that employees get the information they need to make an
economically rational decision other than to provide unions with the names
and addresses of those workers whom they are courting. In order to redesign the regulation surrounding the union representation election, I propose
four facets to a new regulatory model: (a) required disclosure by unions; (b)
optional disclosure by employers, if they wish to participate in the campaign; (c) a more hands-off approach to regulation, except in the case of
misrepresentation; and (d) protected space for employee discourse. These
four reforms are discussed in more detail below.
A. Required Union Disclosure
The union representation election process suffers from informational
failures. Information is distributed asymmetrically, and unions and employers may lack the proper incentives to ensure that employees get the
information they need to make the decision. As in the securities regulation
context, as well as many other contractual contexts, a system of mandatory
information disclosure would be useful in ensuring that consumers get relevant information.
What would such a system look like? My hope is that this piece will
begin the debate about exactly this question. Here are a few thoughts about
the content of the disclosure, as well as the means of delivering that content
to employees.
1. Content
What sorts of information are relevant and material to the union representation question? The answer may vary by election, by individual, and by
time period. Further empirical research would be extremely useful in de-

that “investors may make a realistic appraisal of the merits of securities and thus exercise an informed
judgment in determining whether to purchase them”), quoted in George J. Bentson, The Effectiveness
and Effects of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE
REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 24 (Henry G. Manne ed. 1969).
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termining exactly what workers want to know in making their decision.
The following categories serve as a starting point in determining what data
workers might want.
(a) Dues and fees. Obviously, employees would want to know how
much their dues would be and what initiation fees would be required. The
LMRDA requires disclosure of union dues in both the union’s initial filings
133
and in its annual reports. As the Local 1199 SEIU example demonstrates,
however, the union may disclose a range of dues and fees rather than a specific amount. In such cases, employees would want to know exactly how
much the union is proposing to charge in their particular case.
Employees may also want a sense of whether those dues are likely to
change in the next few years. Given the difficulties of exit, employees are
essentially signing up for as much as a three-year contract when they agree
to union representation. Although unions may not know what their future
financial needs will be, they may have information about future dues prices
that would be useful to the employees’ decision. The union could be
required to disclose whether any dues or fees hikes are set to be voted on by
the members, or whether union officials have plans for such an increase in
the upcoming year.
(b) Organizational structure. Like any organization, potential members generally would want to know how the union is structured and what its
policies are for members. The union must disclose its constitution and bylaws under the LMRDA. Form LM-1 asks the union to list such information as qualifications for or restrictions on membership, authorization for
disbursement of funds, the types of audits the labor organization undergoes,
the calling of regular and special meetings, the selection of officers and
stewards, the circumstances under which fines, suspensions, or expulsions
can be imposed, and the requirements for authorizing bargaining demands,
134
contract terms, and strikes. In addition, members may want to know who
135
the union officials are, their backgrounds, and perhaps even their salaries.
132 As discussed earlier, one empirical study discounted the importance of information received by
employees during the campaign. See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY 62-64 (1976) (finding employees generally voted as they thought they would before
the campaign); id. at 76-80 (finding a low recognition rate for campaign issues); id. at 140-43 (arguing
that hands-off regulation is proper, given the lack of importance to the campaign itself). However, as
noted, critics have charged that the data did not support the authors’ normative claims. See Bodie,
Information, supra note 6, at 30 (discussing criticism). In addition, the study was focused on whether
the campaign affected workers’ attitudes, not whether workers were getting the information they needed
to make economically rational decisions.
133 Form LM-1, supra note 47; Form LM-2, supra note 48.
134 Form LM-1, supra note 47.
135 The question of salaries is likely to provoke some controversy. On the one hand, corporations
are required to disclose salary information under federal securities law on the theory that shareholders
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Form LM-2 requires the disclosure of officials and disbursements to officials. Officials could also be required to provide a short biography that
includes certain specific facts, such as education, work experience, criminal
record, and time with the union.
(c) Nature and Quality of Services. Perhaps the most important set of
information for employees would concern the nature and quality of the
representation services provided by the union. There is a distinct infor136
mation asymmetry with respect to information about the union’s services.
Employees who have never belonged to the union do not know how well
the union will do in negotiating new terms, avoiding strikes, managing
grievances, and keeping dues low. When buying a product, consumers can
often see and handle the product, and they are often given the right to return
the product if they find it unsatisfactory. Home buyers hire inspectors, tour
the home, and still benefit from mandatory disclosure requirements on the
part of the seller. Union consumers must base their judgment on the information provided during the campaign, along with any prior knowledge,
opinions, or prejudices they may bring with them to the decision.
There may be ways to get information about performance to
employees making a representation decision. The union’s past and current
collective bargaining agreements provide concrete facts about the terms and
conditions the union has negotiated for other employees. Having access to
these contracts would provide a way for workers to comparison-shop. A
more speculative form of information would be union predictions about
what they expect to negotiate with the employer. The union might present
information about what its initial demands would be, and it could even
provide information about what it expects to get. It could even disclose the
risk that the union will not be able to negotiate a contract, or the likelihood
that the union will call the employees out on strike.
In the world of securities regulation, firms making an initial public
offering are required to disclose reams of financial information about them-

should know what their agents are making. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006); cf. SEC Release Nos. 338655, 34-53185 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8655.pdf (proposing
new rules for executive compensation disclosure). Given that union members have some of the same
agency costs concerns that shareholders do, compensation information may be material. See Stewart J.
Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367,
377-83. However, the purchasers of services generally do not have the right to see the executive compensation for the company from whom they are buying the services. To the extent that employees are
simply consumers of union representation services, such information could be much less relevant in
comparison to the quality of the services. Cf. Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501, 516-17 (arguing that for-profit unions should be allowed to provide union
representation services).
136 Bodie, Information, supra note 6, at 47-51.
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137

Companies are even expected to make predictions about what
selves.
138
future events may damage their prospects of being successful in business.
One could envision a disclosure statement in which unions provided a
richer vision of what they expected to achieve and the difficulties they contemplated facing as part of a mandatory disclosure statement. Of course,
unions would generally endeavor to be as non-specific as possible in order
to avoid recriminations or liability down the road. Unions could also plausibly argue that such statements would reveal too much of their strategies
and would enable the employer to get an advantage in bargaining. As we
consider a mandatory disclosure regime, the pros and cons of such “softer”
statements should be considered alongside the disclosure of “harder” financial data.
(d) Conflicts of Interest. The corporate world places a premium on
disclosure whenever a potential conflict of interest arises between a corpo139
rate officer and the corporation he or she serves. Employees are entitled
to know about any potential conflict of interest between the union and the
employer. Evidence of such a conflict would be any overlap between union
personnel and the employer’s personnel, including spouses and other close
140
relatives, or financial ties between the union and the employer.
Current
or past collective bargaining relationships between the union and the
employer (or an associated company) might also be grounds for a conflict
of interest. Moreover, any contracts between the employer and its affiliates
and the union (or its affiliates) should also be disclosed to employees. The
key here would be to have a sweep broad enough to encompass all of the
potential conflicts. For example, Teri Moore may be president of the
United Forever Union (UFU) and may negotiate a fairly employer-friendly
contract with Blue Industries. If Teri also is the treasurer for Americans
United Union (AUU), and AUU is seeking to represent employees of
Aquamarine Industries, a subsidiary of Blue Industries, then Aquamarine
employees should be told about and given access to the UFU contract with
Blue Industries. The regulations would have to be written to prevent

137

See Part I.C supra.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006) (requiring that the filer “[d]escribe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations”).
139 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes Oyster, Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979, 986 (Wash.
1964) (”A corporation cannot ratify the breach of fiduciary duties unless full and complete disclosure of
all facts and circumstances is made by the fiduciary and an intentional relinquishment by the corporation
of its rights.”).
140 Such ties could be quite attenuated. It would be important to identify all companies in which
the employer had a significant ownership stake and to include those companies in any analysis.
138
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employers and unions from avoiding the disclosure requirements simply by
creating new corporations or labor organizations.
But aside from this concern, the Board would easily be able to provide
this information to employees by piggybacking on top of existing disclosure
required. Unions and employers are unlikely to provide this information
themselves during the course of the campaign. In fact, the incentives are
inverse: the more troublesome the disclosures would be (for both union and
141
employer), the less likely they are to be disclosed. Although industrious
employees might find these disclosures on their own, the Board would provide a real service by making sure employees get this information as part of
ensuring that “laboratory conditions” exist.
2. Delivery
Technology may provide the answer to this dilemma. The Board could
provide for the mandatory disclosure in two steps. The first step would be a
short form distributed to all employees with a few pieces of critical information included. The second step would be an Internet website, similar to
EDGAR, that would provide access to all of the other information the
Board required to be disclosed. In this manner, all employees would be
given a set of disclosures that many would be likely to read. At the same
time, the few more industrious employees would have channeled access to
important information that may take much longer to absorb.
The primary issue surrounding the first step would be determining the
exact scope of the information to be provided. While the Board would want
to gather more information and could even consider rulemaking on this
142
issue, commentators may want to focus on determining what sorts of
information employees most want and how to convey that information most
concisely. Union dues and fees applicable to the voting employees, for
example, could be specified briefly. Terms and conditions of employment
in the union’s other collective bargaining agreements could not. To some
extent, the Board might want to use the short form to tip off employees
about information they could get through the website. However, for the

141 See Bodie, Information, supra note 6; Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010).
142 For advocacy of more rulemaking by the Board, see Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at
the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985); Samuel Estreicher & Matthew
T. Bodie, Review Essay: Administrative Delay at the NLRB: Some Modest Proposals, 23 J. LAB. RES.
87, 98-99 (2002). For a discussion of the Board’s antipathy towards rulemaking, see Joan Flynn, The
Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75
B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995).
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most part the Board would want to keep the short form as a simple summary of the most critical facts about the union and its services.
The primary issues surrounding the second step would be the design of
the website, the costs in implementing the system, and the likelihood that
employees would benefit from the system. In terms of the design, this
again is an issue for future policy development by the Board. It should be
fairly straightforward, however, to design a standard page for each election
which would provide access to the additional sets of information. The
Department of Labor has brought its entire LMRDA disclosure system
online, making it fairly simple to link to the Department of Labor’s website
or even directly link to the particular union’s disclosure within the Depart143
ment’s database. Other documents, such as the union’s past and present
collective bargaining agreements, could be posted to the page as documents
that could be downloaded. Moreover, the page could also link to the
union’s website in order to provide access to information. In terms of costs,
it is fairly simple to create a webpage, and Board technicians could use the
144
same web design for each representation election. It would be far simpler
to post electronic versions of collective bargaining agreements on the web,
as opposed to photocopying these agreements and distributing them to
employees.
There is some question as to whether employees would use such a
system. However, computer ownership and Internet use continue to grow
145
across the country. Many employees have access to the Internet at work.
As many other commentators have suggested, using the web is a costeffective, extremely accessible method of distributing lots of information to

143 See Final Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. at58,374-75; Department of Labor, LMRDA Reporting &
Disclosure, at: http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-lmrda.htm. Interestingly, ERISA has a
requirement that the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury work together when they are requesting
similar information. 29 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006). The NLRB could similarly work with other branches of
the Department of Labor to make sure that LMRDA-required information was provided to employees in
the midst of a union organizing drive.
144 In his commentary on my paper, Harold Maier raised a number of questions with regard to the
content and mechanics of such a website. A straightforward template would be necessary to allow the
Board’s regional offices to get the disclosure websites operating quickly and efficiently. Certainly, there
are many questions at the margins about what this template would look like. However, the Board can
develop a disclosure structure that would be sufficiently mechanical for the routine use. A very rudimentary disclosure regime might make sense at the beginning; after all, it took the SEC roughly a
decade (1985-1994) to develop a fully operational disclosure database. See Charnas & Nordlund, supra
note 123, at 285-86.
145 Recent studies have found that over eighty percent of Americans use the Internet, and twothirds have a high-speed Internet connection at home. Aaron Smith, Home Broadband 2010, Pew
Research Center (Aug. 11, 2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Press-Releases/2010/HomeBroadband-2010.aspx.
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a large number of employees. It can overcome the Lechmere access problems that have made it difficult for information to reach employees.
Providing unions with access to the employees (electronically) together
with employee access to mandatory disclosure about the union would
provide an ideal mix of information to employees.
B. Employer Disclosure
This article has focused primarily on the need for employees to get
information about the union offering its services. Given that unions are
seeking to provide services on behalf of the employees, it makes sense to
focus on their dues, internal organization, quality of services and potential
conflicts of interest. However, information about the employer is also
147
relevant to the representation decision. Although there is ample ground
for further discussion and research, this article proposes a system of
employer disclosure in which employers would be given an option. The
employer could provide a set of mandatory disclosures and then participate
in the campaign, or the employer could remain neutral and provide no disclosure. This option would provide employers with a choice. They could
contest the union’s efforts by putting their own cards on the table, or they
could stay out of the process entirely.
What kinds of information would the employer provide? Again, further research is necessary to determine exactly what kinds of employer
information are relevant and important to making a rational union representation election. Ties to the union are certainly relevant, and it may make
sense to impose a duty on the employer to make disclosures about any
potential conflicts of interest between itself and the union. The company’s
finances are also relevant, as its financial condition may dictate what level
of wages and benefits it could provide to employees. Much of the information useful to potential shareholders would also be useful to employees
contemplating unionization (albeit perhaps for different reasons). In this
regard, the Board could piggyback off disclosures made by publicly-traded
companies to the SEC. The Board could provide a link to the employer’s
EDGAR disclosures through the election website, just as it would link to
union disclosures at the website as well.
146 See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace:
Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Susan S. Robfogel, Electronic Communication and the NLRA: Union Access and Employer Rights, 16 LAB. L.J. 231 (2000);
Gwynne A. Wilcox, Section 7 Rights of Employees and Union Access to Employees: Cyber Organizing,
16 LAB. L.J. 253 (2000); Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)Workers’ Rights: The NLRA and Employee Electronic Communications, 105 YALE L.J. 1639 (1996); Wissinger, supra note 29, at 347-48.
147 See Lofaso, supra note 6, at 41.
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This system of optional disclosure would have two policy objectives.
The first would be to increase the availability and accessibility of information about the employer to employees. The second objective would be
to put a premium on employer participation within the campaign. As noted
above, perhaps the primary justification for employer involvement in the
union campaign is the employer’s role in providing negative information
about the union to employees. A system of mandatory union disclosure
would weaken that justification. If the regime of disclosure is comprehensive enough, perhaps employers could be ushered completely out of the
148
election process, leading to a de jure system of employer neutrality. Such
a system, however, would have to overcome complicated free speech and
informational concerns. A system of optional disclosure would put a price
on participation – a price rationally related to representation election
regulation.
C. Reconfiguring Campaign Regulation
The Board’s regime of representation election regulation has long been
criticized for its indeterminate and hair-splitting standards. Since the Board
has not been all that concerned with managing the information in the campaign, the proposed system of disclosure would not necessarily affect the
Board’s prohibitions on coercion, bribery, or inflammatory appeals; such
regimes could coexist. At the same time, a new disclosure regime might
provide an opportunity for the Board to reexamine the current prohibitions
and adopt a simpler, more streamlined system. If the union and employer
are providing critical information to the employees up front, then perhaps
employees will place less emphasis on the information they learn from the
participants during the campaign. However, given the different purposes of
much of the Board’s regulation, perhaps there need not be any changes to
the Board’s efforts to regulate speech and conduct that have the tendency to
coerce employees in the exercise of their choice.
However, there is one reform that would substantially supplement and
strengthen the disclosure regime: penalties for misrepresentation and fraud.
Unlike perhaps every other regime of commercial regulation, the Board’s
regulation of the union representation election does not penalize for fraud.
This failure is anathema to the need for employees to trust the information
they are getting from unions and employers. Required disclosures would be
148 Employer neutrality has many advocates. See James Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card
Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819 (2005) (supporting the
enforceability of employer neutrality agreements); Bodie, Information, supra note 6, at 51-55
(discussing the skewed incentives of employers to participate in the election campaign); Sachs, supra
note 141, at 680-91 (discussing the deleterious effects of employer intervention on employee choice).
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useless if there are no penalties for failures or misrepresentations in those
disclosures. The Board should, at the least, treat material misrepresentations as grounds for overturning an election, and it should treat any error or
omission in the mandatory disclosure as per se material. The Board could
also consider stronger penalties such as monetary damages or injunctive
relief. In making a union representation decision, employees should be
protected against fraud as consumers generally are when making economic
149
decisions. Fraud should not be tolerated.
D. Providing Space for Employee Discourse
In the 1980s, the SEC saw the opportunity for a new approach to disclosure and public access to that disclosure. In developing the EDGAR
system, the SEC has changed the ability of shareholders, prospective shareholders, and the markets as a whole to have easy access to critical infor150
mation.
The NLRB, on the other hand, has been generally reluctant to
151
Perhaps
engage in changes based on new technological possibilities.
most (in)famously, the Board has made it very easy for employers to prohibit union email solicitations or other communication while permitting
employees to engage in virtually every other kind of non-work-related
152
exchanges.
Rather than using the new medium to provide for greater
access to information and communication, the Board relied on traditional
property law analysis to shut down a potential avenue of growth.
Professor Jeffrey Hirsch has been a consistent and thoughtful advocate
for ways in which the Board can use electronic technologies to improve the
153
functioning of the NLRA. In a recent paper, Hirsch argues that the Board
154
needs to do more to encourage employee discourse. Given the difficulties
inherent in collective action, Hirsch points out that the Board cannot
assume that providing a limited avenue for communication is sufficient.
Instead, the Board needs to take steps to encourage employee discourse. He
149 Kent Greenfield has discussed the lack of fraud protection for employees in the context of the
labor market more generally. Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in
the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715 (1997).
150 Don Langevoort, among others, saw the possibilities for EDGAR from its inception. Donald
C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV.
747, 757-58 (1985) (discussing EDGAR’s potential to “reduce investors' dependence on financial intermediaries for the collection and distribution of information”).
151 I say this with regard to the Board’s policies in enforcing the Act, not its internal management.
152 Guard Publ’g Co. d/b/a The Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1111 (2007), enforcement
granted in part and denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
153 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 262 (2008); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L.
REV. 891 (2006).
154 Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 7.
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suggests not only striking down employer restrictions on employee communications, but also providing for more structured discourse during
155
election campaigns and providing notices to employees about their rights.
A disclosure regime would be an important addition to Hirsch’s discourse
model. It would provide a baseline of information from which further
discussion could spring. As Hirsch points out, “a meaningful right of
collective action requires employees to have enough information to exercise
156
that right.” I would encourage the NLRB to look to the example of the
SEC in matching a system of information disclosure with the technological
means to make the information easily accessible to those who need it.
As part of the disclosure websites discussed in Part II(A)(2), the Board
could also provide for virtual discussion areas for employees to “meet”
electronically and discuss collective employee issues. These areas could be
discussion boards, blogs, or even virtual space in online worlds such as
157
Second Life.
Such electronic meeting places would provide employees
with a neutral space in which to carry on the discourse necessary to collective bargaining. Such spaces could be employees only, or unions and
employers might have limited access to the space to facilitate the dialogue.
There is ample evidence that employees are using these spaces already in
the context of their work life and their personal life. It would be a natural
extension for many employees to engage in workplace discourse electroni158
cally. Employing technology creatively could give the Board an invigorated role in workplace life in the new century.
E.

Intended Effects of the New Regime

In laying out a framework for reform, I wish to conclude by talking
about the two general goals of these reforms – two effects they should
endeavor to create. First, the disclosure regime should highlight many of
the more egregious conflicts of interest between labor organizations and
employers. If ties between the union and company are highlighted for
employees, employees will be in a much better position to police such ties.
Second, a more rational and organized system of information regulation
will help employees make more informed and rational decisions. And to
the extent that employees could better trust the information they are getting,
they may feel more comfortable committing themselves to union
mem155

Id. at 20-62.
Id. at 52.
157 For a discussion of workplace issues in virtual worlds, see Miriam A. Cherry, Working for
(Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV.
1077 (2009).
158 For a discussion of the NLRA in the electronic workplace, see Malin & Perritt, supra note 147.
156
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bership. Certainly, better information could lead to the result that even
fewer employees decide to join unions. But whatever the result, a system
of disclosure would provide employees with the tools to better evaluate the
decisions before them. In the long run, more rational decisions will mean
more efficient ones, which will ultimately leave society better off.
III. CONCLUSION
The Board, courts, and academic commentators have (with good
reason) focused on employer coercion and administrative delay as key concerns in the regulation of the union representation election. However, the
critical role of information – information necessary to make an efficient
representation decision – has been neglected. This paper argues for a new
approach to representation elections: one that creates disclosure requirements for both unions and employers, as well as one that empowers the
Board to manage the flow of information to employees. At the least, this
new approach will help prevent conflicts of interest that despoil the
relationship between a union and its members. However, such a process
may ultimately lead to a newly invigorated market for representation driven
by a wiser, more informed class of employees.

